ABSTRACT

Originally published in 1973. In this systematic treatise, Anthony Quinton examines the concept of substance, a philosophical refinement of the everyday notion of a thing. Four distinct, but not unconnected, problems about substance are identified: what accounts for the individuality of a thing; what confers identity on a thing; what is the relation between a thing and its appearances; and what kind of thing is fundamental, in the sense that its existence is logically independent of that of any other kind of thing? In Part 1, the first two problems are discussed, while in Part 2, the third and fourth are considered. Part 3 examines four kinds of thing that have been commonly held to be in some way non-material: abstract entities; the un-observable entities of scientific theory; minds and their states; and, finally, values. The author argues that theoretical entities and mental states are, in fact, material. He gives a linguistic account of universals and necessary truths and advances a naturalistic theory of value.

part I|2 pages

Substance

chapter |9 pages

Introduction

The four problems of substance

chapter 1|21 pages

Individuation

chapter 2|24 pages

Things

chapter 3|24 pages

Identity

chapter 4|26 pages

Ultimates

part II|2 pages

Knowledge

chapter |10 pages

Introduction

Knowledge as a system

chapter 5|24 pages

Intuition

chapter 6|29 pages

Certainty

chapter 7|36 pages

Perception

chapter 8|25 pages

Coherence

part III|2 pages

Ideas

chapter |17 pages

Introduction

Metaphysics

chapter 9|30 pages

Essence

chapter 10|32 pages

Theory

chapter 11|37 pages

Mind

chapter 12|30 pages

Value