ABSTRACT
C.A. Helvétius – admired by Bentham for contributing ‘a standard of rectitude for actions’ – is shown to be, like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, a utilitarian writer basing himself on the moral sense understood as feelings of morality entailing specifically other-regarding sentiment directed towards enhancing the general happiness. Those sympathetic feelings are ascribed by Helvétius to ‘personal-’ or ‘self-interest’, although when addressing policy issues he considered most men to be governed in their ‘personal interest’ by crude selfishness. The ascription of feelings of morality to a sense of interest, while at the same time representing morality in terms of other-regarding sentiment, is precisely Locke’s position. My account is organised around Mill’s perspective which follows Bentham in crediting Helvétius – along with Hume – for the doctrine that general utility is the foundation of morality. Also taken under consideration is Mill’s commendation of David Hartley, perceived as utilitarian, for recognizing ‘the feelings of “the moral sense”’ as a fact of life, thereby weakening Mill’s own eighteenth-nineteenth century contrast dating largely to the 1830s between moral-sense adherents opposed to the utility doctrine and utilitarians.
