ABSTRACT

Based on formal content analysis of the writings of Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov and past Soviet ministers of defense and heads of the Politburo, James J. Tritten interprets what the Soviets say they will do in the event of nuclear war. He then constructs a hardware and exercise analysis of the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a nuclear war, offering three possible cases–the a bolt from the blue, with existing forces on patrol; full mobilization; and a plausible case of partial mobilization. In addition, Dr. Tritten examines, from a Soviet perspective, concepts of deterrence, the strategic goals and missions of the fleet, nuclear targeting policy, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) disruption mission, and the potential for tactical nuclear warfare limited to the sea. The author concludes by assessing the implications of Soviet politico-military planning for Western defense strategy and arms control.

part One|101 pages

Content Analysis

chapter 1|7 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|13 pages

Methodology

chapter 3|15 pages

Naval Influence on War

chapter 4|11 pages

Fleet Versus Shore

chapter 5|16 pages

Fleet Versus Fleet

chapter 6|27 pages

Soviet Military Strategy

chapter 7|5 pages

Findings of Declaratory Policy

part Two|92 pages

Hardware Analysis

chapter 8|7 pages

Methodology

chapter 9|19 pages

Strategie Nuclear Forces

chapter 10|19 pages

Nuclear Threat Assessment

chapter 11|10 pages

Navy Strategic Nuclear Force Issues

chapter 13|20 pages

General Purpose Forces

part Three|43 pages

Findings and Conclusions

chapter 14|17 pages

Findings

chapter 15|23 pages

Conclusions and Implications