ABSTRACT

The first two years of the Reagan administration saw a close correlation between improved unofficial relations between Washington and Taipei and a deterioration of strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing. These developments led many U.S. officials and scholars to conclude that U.S. security interests may require periodic concessions over Taiwan to ensure China ‘s cooperation in countering the Soviet threat. Rejecting this view, Mr. Lasater argues that Washington’s and Beijing’s bilateral relations with Moscow and not the Taiwan issue are the key international determinants of Sino-American strategic cooperation. Examining the parameters of that cooperation and the role of Taiwan in Sino-American relations, Mr. Lasater suggests that Beijing is deliberately using U.S. security concerns to seek concessions on Taiwan and other issues. He advises a policy that stands firm in negotiations with the Chinese and that resists the temptation to make politically expedient concessions--a more balanced course of action whereby improved relations with Beijing are sought concurrently with the maintenance of friendly, unofficial ties with Taipei.

part I|89 pages

Sino-American Strategic Relations

chapter 1|10 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|10 pages

The National Power of the PRC

chapter 3|36 pages

Sino-Soviet Relations

chapter 4|19 pages

China’s Independent Foreign Policy

part II|147 pages

The Role of Taiwan

chapter 6|31 pages

Taiwan Today: An Overview

chapter 7|31 pages

The Security of Taiwan

chapter 8|25 pages

The Taiwan Issue

chapter 9|24 pages

Period of Contention: 1981–1982

chapter 10|17 pages

The August 17, 1982 Joint Communique

chapter 11|18 pages

Epilogue

part III|14 pages

Conclusion

chapter 12|13 pages

Summary and Policy Recommendations