ABSTRACT
This book examines the organizational problems faced by the U.S. government in developing an effective strategy to counter terrorism and presents a detailed history of U.S. counter-terrorist policy since 1972. Dr. Farrell offers a working definition of terrorism, reviews its international, transnational, nonterritorial, and domestic forms, then focuses on the activities of those U.S. government agencies directly concerned with the prevention or neutralization of terrorism Critical of existing programs and of the fact that counter-terrorist activities seem to have a low priority among the duties of the relevant agencies' key executives, he concludes that the development of a clear, reasonable, and effective strategy against terrorism has been unnecessarily delayed. He is doubtful whether, even now, a satisfactory arrangement has been achieved. Beyond looking strictly at governmental agency responses to terrorism, Dr. Farrell considers the sociological, legal, and operational factors that would be brought into play should military forces be employed to quell a terrorist attack and also addresses the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to U.S. businesses.
