ABSTRACT

Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories of legal obligation.

The notion of legal obligation is widely regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials make reference to obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges, powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation championed in legal philosophy today.

With contributions from renowned theorists, this book will be invaluable for scholars and students of legal theory, legal philosophy, and jurisprudence.

chapter 1|17 pages

Contemporary theories of legal obligation

A tentative critical map

chapter 2|16 pages

Two kinds of normativity

chapter 4|14 pages

Hans Kelsen as outlier

The defence of a radical norm theory

chapter 6|16 pages

Normativity for positivists

chapter 7|18 pages

Unstated legal obligations

chapter 8|17 pages

Legal obligation and the criminal law

chapter 10|20 pages

Persuade or obey

Crito and the preconditions for justice