ABSTRACT
Drawing on the literature on agrarian history, conflict, and state-building, the chapter’s main argument is that the window for change opened by the Havana peace talks needs to be viewed in light of the prior constraints imposed by the status quo trajectory of rural development policy, established in Colombia long beforehand. Its anti-peasant bias, coupled with its skewed decision-making arrangements, have created over time an environment that is adverse for distributive measures. In line with critical agrarian scholars, this chapter emphasizes how pre-existing structures and institutions—particularly the rural elites command over policy—constitute a significant obstacle for reform. Throughout the twentieth century, rural elites successfully maintained their anti-distributive stance, shielding through various ways their interests even from the mildest of reforms. The chapter examines this power reproduction of rural elites as the product of three interrelated and mutually reinforcing processes: interest group formation, the absence of a strong central government in rural areas that went hand in hand with the expansion of the armed conflict, and the structural trends and market pressures in agriculture over the last four decades. The chapter ends with an analysis of recent agricultural policies in Colombia with an emphasis on Uribe’s regressive rural policy.
