ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the government’s low capacity to implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR). Unlike other war-torn countries, in Colombia the explanation as to why there has been a limited implementation of the CRR so far has to do not so much with a generalized absence of the state but with a number of more nuanced and complex political and policy processes taking place within and outside the government that need to be properly traced. The chapter thus unpacks the “black box” of central government capacity by analyzing three interrelated yet distinct factors: the bureaucracy, the political regime, and interest groups. Located at varying scales, each of these factors points to a different site of power and intra-government dynamics. Combined, they provide a full picture of the internal constraints to adopt the peace agreement’s provisions. With regards to the bureaucracy, the chapter argues that there was a lack of alignment with the peace agenda among the decision-makers and an ineffective coordination between government offices in the preparatory work for the CRR’s implementation. In relation to the political regime, the chapter shows how the support that Santos obtained from its multi-party coalition to carry out the peace negotiations took a high toll on the implementation, as the institutions responsible for turning the CRR’s provisions into effective policy were allotted to politicians not interested in moving forward the distributive agenda. Regarding interest groups, the chapter illustrates how, due to its privileged position, the agribusiness elite was able to influence policy decisions related to the implementation of the CRR’s land distribution provisions.
