ABSTRACT
Any serious theory of language must allow for some sort of distinction between meaning and force and for the complexities of the relations between the two. How far should philosophers take into consideration the play of forces likely to be at work as they take part in philosophical activity, and to what extent will the way in which they seek (or not seek) to do so affect the “rationality” of what they produce and of their performance in producing it? From this point of view the overriding concern of those who persist in believing philosophy to be an essentially rational and truth-orientated endeavour, may shift from one directed primarily to the validity of their argument structures or the truth of their theses to one directed primarily to the truthfulness of their attempts to communicate them and to the integrity of their argumentation. In the words of C.S. Peirce, quoted by Susan Haack, “In order to reason well. . ., it is absolutely necessary to possess . . . such virtues as intellectual honesty and . . . a real love of truth.”
