ABSTRACT
Theories of inductive support have been attacked by some philosophers on certain historical, or quasi-historical, grounds. An adequate theory of inductive support will be so constructed that it is quite consistent with the normal kinds of non-standard responses to falsificatory evidence; and several of the exist. Simplification-functions are thus an important species of non-standard inductive function. Inductive functors can take a non-standard interpretation in regard to permissible types of filler for their argument-places, as well as in regard to the type of grading that they signify. A non-standard role has been established for inductive functions in regard to judgements about the relation between scientific hypotheses and reports of experimental test-results. Analogous difficulties must obviously block any attempt to devise a measure for the relevance of legal variables, and therewith any attempt to treat inductive support from judicial precedent as a measurable quantity.
