ABSTRACT

Within two years of their abortive invasion of the Suez Canal zone in 1956, British troops once again intervened in a major Middle Eastern country. The Jordan intervention of July 1958 took place despite the steady decline of the British position in the country over the previous three years. This book examines why the government led by Harold Macmillan remained ready to use military force to prop up the regime of King Hussein even though the United States had emerged as the main Western power in the Middle East after 1956. Incorporating a variety of archival material, Blackwell provides new historical insights into the origins of the Anglo-American use of military power to protect their interests in the Middle East.

chapter 1|9 pages

Introduction

Jordan, Suez and the Decline of British Influence in the Middle East

chapter 2|21 pages

Glubb's Jordan

The Arab Legion, the Hashemites and the Nationalist Challenge, 1948–1956

chapter 3|19 pages

Amman Under the Shadow of Nasser

Jordanian Nationalism and the Suez Crisis, April–November 1956

chapter 5|19 pages

The Kings Against the Colonels

Jordan and the Anglo-American Plot to Overthrow the Syrian Government, 1957

chapter 6|18 pages

Combating Nasser

Anglo-American Support for Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, November 1957–June 1958

chapter 8|18 pages

A Tenuous Foothold

British Paratroops Deploy in Amman, July–August 1958

chapter 9|18 pages

Managing the International Crisis

Creating a UN ‘Mantle' for Jordan, September–November 1958

chapter 10|23 pages

Belated Reappraisals

Anglo-American Policy, Regional Nationalism and the Future of Jordan, November 1958–March 1959

chapter 11|6 pages

Conclusion