ABSTRACT

This chapter aims to develop the idea that our knowledge of what counts as microaggression generates from and builds upon the critical reflection of our cumulative experiences of marginalization. It explains some necessary background about microaggressions, and describes the conceptual framework for analyzing the primary and two secondary epistemic harms of microaggression. The secondary epistemic harms of microaggression occur in the aftermath of the initial microaggression, when people around the microaggressed often cannot or do not see it as a microaggression. The chapter provides two cases of microaggression in academia in order to unpack the concepts, and discusses the primary epistemic harms in these two cases in “Primary Epistemic Harms.” It explores the two secondary harms of microaggressions, and delves into a possible avenue of resistance to microaggression. A different way of characterizing the problem with the functional analysis is this: it takes the focus off the personal experiences of victims of microaggression.