ABSTRACT
The cumulative network model (CNM) of the self has a different approach from standard psychological and animal accounts of persons to the fusion and fission thought experiments about personal identity, experiments concerning brain or body transplants, spontaneous biological fission, teletransportation and duplicate emergents, and Swampman. CNM says that in fusion (two to one) and fission (one to two) cases, the self does not continue, even though in singular cases of body replacement (such as in the teleporter and Swampman cases) the self does continue. Fusion and fission disrupt the network such that it cannot spread over two emergents. CNM argues that what matters is the integrity of the network. While psychological continuity is normally a constituent of that, such continuity alone is not sufficient for continuation of the self. On the other side, bodily continuity, normally a constituent of the integrity of the network, may not be necessary if the singular emergent in the teleporter experiment is a plausible continuant of the self. Thus, CNM differs from psychological accounts of persons, which allow for continuation of the self in fusion and fission, and from animal accounts, which disallow continuation of the self even in singular cases of bodily replacement.
