This chapter offers a more detailed interpretation which will facilitate an examination of Jean-Paul Sartre’s reading and a more thorough exploration of Edmund Husserl’s position. It begins with a general description of Husserl’s version of phenomenology and examines a careful elucidation of his discussion of the constitution of the sense ‘other conscious subject.’ Husserl takes the defining characteristic of a science to be the fact that its truths can be repeatedly verified by any meditator with self-evident givenness. Husserl uses elevated standards of evidence which exclude everything but one’s own mental states and their sense-correlates from the realm of the self-evident. Husserl might have been misled about self-perception because of his Cartesian standpoint, a highly reflective standpoint in which one’s own mental processes tend to stand out more vividly. His standpoint excludes much that must be investigated if one is to achieve adequate clarification of the structures of interpersonal experience.