ABSTRACT
Martin Heidegger's explicit statements suggest an emphasis on the meta-level, but his actual results suggest an emphasis on the object-level. He seeks to supersede the subject-object distinction by revising the conception of each side of the distinction. Heidegger begins by claiming that there is no experience of the self in everyday life. He supports this by challenging the various linguistic and experiential motivations that lead one to postulate the self. Heidegger wishes to avoid the Cartesian overtones of this description, but he acknowledges this reflexivity when he asserts that one’s existence is always at issue or in question, at least implicitly. Heidegger’s real point may be that the origin and direction of one’s actions do not typically arise from one’s own self, but from the impersonal mode of selfness. Although Heidegger presents some intriguing propositions, his defense of them leaves much to be desired.
