ABSTRACT
The advocates of the new movement maintain that it has removed psychology from the sphere of philosophy proper and has erected it into an autonomous natural science. This chapter refers to what is known as psychologism, the doctrine which attempts to unite psychology and philosophy and rejects the twofold point of view dear to the neo-Kantian schools, which very often enables them to play a double game with thought. F. Brentano theory of the superiority of psychology to natural science, which he maintained, in a period of naturalism, with a vigour that was amazing. Brentano, like Lange, tries to use his point of view in order to establish the objectivity of knowledge. T. Lipps is the successor of Brentano. He feels more acutely the urgency of the problem concealed in Brentano’s descriptions and definitions, and in consequence he has more explicitly revealed the weakness of the procedure common to both.
