ABSTRACT
Any attempt to analyse the Faysal-Weizmann Agreement must take into account the incoherence, confusion and conflicts of interest that affected British imperial policymaking in the Middle East. In London, the government’s realpolitik of supporting the Zionist cause in Palestine clashed with the Middle East Command’s goal to establish a viable Arab status quo under British hegemony. Lt. Col. Sir Mark Sykes’ extensive reports from the Middle East – at times stretching the facts in order to sway his audience – established him as the government’s expert on the region, at least until 1918. Weizmann gave only a cursory consideration to securing the agreement of the Palestinian Arabs to the Zionists’ return. In 1908 and again in 1913–1914, Zionist representatives held talks with non-Palestinian Arab groups. On the Zionist side, Weizmann’s leadership was virtually a one-man show. Weizmann’s discovery of acetone in 1915 was a major contribution to the British war effort.
