ABSTRACT
This chapter address the issue of relevance, which may have formed a point of difference between procedure in the homicide courts and the dikastic courts. It argues that there was a distinctive emphasis on relevance for speakers in the homicide courts, while relevance was expected but not as strictly demanded in the dikastic courts. It establishes the kinds of statements that may have been considered irrelevant in the homicide courts by examining moments when speakers explicitly identify statements as verging on contravening the rule. It then assesses instances of the use of the relevance rule as a rhetorical device in itself: there are several cases, both within and outside of the homicide courts, where the rule is referred to by speakers in order to defend their own statements, attack those of their opponents, or implore the judges to behave in a more just manner. It closes by examining some examples of speeches from the homicide courts that employ narrative techniques in order to include material that may have approached irrelevance and sought to achieve similar effects, such as character assassination and self-aggrandisement.
