ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the Shaftesburian theory of substance. It examines David Hume’s critique of the notion of necessary connection. The chapter analyses Hume’s explanation of the belief in necessary connection between objects. If Hume was to show that his theory of mind was theoretically more plausible than the theory of Shaftesburian substance, it was incumbent upon him to attack the notion of a necessary connection among existents. Shaftesbury was a holist. Throughout his works, he alludes to the need to have knowledge of nature as a whole in order to properly understand the parts of it. Hume’s argument against necessary connections is a metaphysical argument. If sound, this argument alone is sufficient to show that perceptions are independent entities, a point that is crucial for the theoretical primacy of Humean perceptions. Having explained the belief in the principle of the uniformity of nature, Hume proceeds to explain the beliefs in the several kinds of probability along similar lines.
