ABSTRACT
When it comes to their ontological status, scientific theories have long been compared to musical works, with both taken to occupy some kind of abstract realm. With regard to such works, Collingwood famously wrote, ‘If the making of a tune is an instance of an imaginative creation, a tune is an imaginary thing. And the same applies to a poem or a painting or any other work of art’ (Collingwood 1938/71: 139). For the artist as ‘proper artist’, rather than as a craftperson, the musical work as an imaginary thing is already ‘complete and perfect’. The performance of such a work then involves a reconstruction by the audience, as part of a ‘total imaginary experience’. Collingwood further extended this comparison to scientific theories, arguing that when presented in seminars and conferences, the audience likewise engages in a reconstruction of the thesis at issue via a form of ‘active thinking’.
Focusing on this specific aspect of scientific practice I shall argue against the view that such presentations involve the reconstruction of the ‘same’ theory (essentially on the grounds that we cannot establish the required identity conditions). Instead I shall apply an eliminativist view of theories, developed elsewhere, which maintains that theories (and models) should not be reified as abstract entities, in some sense. And I shall argue that presentations of these theories help to establish the ‘truth makers’ for certain claims that we take to be ‘about’ such theories. (Likewise, for performances and pieces of music, respectively). Such claims may refer to certain aesthetic qualities attributed to theories and I shall argue that by situating these qualities within the actual practices of science—in particular, the presentations and publications by which results are shared—we can better grasp their nature and function.
