ABSTRACT
The general nature of belief having been defined, its causes remain to be ascertained. David Hume observes that in an association between ideas there is no “belief or persuasion.” Custom, then, is not enough. That the idea evoked by association may have the added force and vivacity characteristic of belief, an actual impression is required. A “reality” actually present thus consists of a system of memories associated in “every particular” with “present impressions.” The difference between belief in the existence of realities present, and belief in their existence as represented by inference, thus being explained, Hume proceeds directly to consider the effects of adventitious associations by resemblance and contiguity on beliefs of the latter sort. Inference to a felt superiority in chances would arise in the case of Hume’s example, where a die thrown has four sides marked with one set of pips, the other two sides being marked with another set.
