ABSTRACT

I agree with Prof. Messerlin that the present antidumping rules are defective and that antidumping proceedings often lack an economic rationale, are abused for protectionist purposes, or are administered in a manner inconsistent with domestic competition laws. But I am not convinced of his view that the industrialized countries are no more constraining forces in the field of antidumping rules. The majority of antidumping proceedings continue to be directed against imports from developed countries, and the latter have a strong self-interest in further limiting the potential abuse of antidumping rules and proceedings. I also have doubts as to Prof. Messerlin's policy proposal to aim at a formal amendment of GATT Article VI rather than to use the "code approach"; for, the 64 acceptances necessary for a formal amendment of GATT Article VI are difficult to obtain and would not change the fact that the antidumping laws of the major trading countries are governed by the 1979 GATT Antidumping Code. International agreement on various regulatory problems, such as the regulation of "input dumping" and "cumulative causation", may also be easier to achieve among the limited number of contracting parties participating in the GATT Antidumping Code than on the worldwide level of the 96 GATT contracting parties. The practical experience with the 1979 GATT Antidumping Code seems to confirm that the "code approach" can be effectively used for coordinating and strengthening domestic antidumping laws and practices. The 15 proposals listed in the paper by Commercial Attaché S. Chang from the Republic of Korea indicate that also developing countries consider the "code approach" as a more realistic strategy for clarifying and tightening the legal disciplines for antidumping proceedings.