ABSTRACT
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has based its deterrent on the principle that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe succeeded. The primary impetus to doctrinal change is the simple instinctive notion that deterrence should not rest on an irrational doctrine, that a potentially suicidal nuclear doctrine is irrational, and, hence, that there must be some less unsatisfactory alternative. Much analysis of conventional deterrence is purely military in content, based on capabilities. Whether given capabilities deter, tempt, or provoke attack is highly dependent on political factors—especially on the nature of a potential attacker's motives and beliefs. Three-quarters of the way through the Reagan administration, the possibility of major changes in the nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union burst upon the scene. Radical cuts in intercontinental forces would symbolize a delegitimization of nuclear forces and imply some greater consensus on their unusability.
