ABSTRACT
The intricate diplomatic moves that took place during the period 1985-1988 on both regional and global levels concerning the "international conference option" comprise in the aggregate an additional case study. The juxtaposition of the two dichotomous models may help identify and sharpen not only the irreconcilable differences that separate the two extremes in terms of the specific processes advocated, but also—paradoxically—the common denominator that creates a strange but nonetheless organic, almost symbiotic, bond between them. An historical review of the initial Jordanian position concerning the preferred structure and nature of the peacemaking process establishes a picture of basic continuity from the period following the Six-Day War of June 1967. However, in the wake of Hussein's 1985 initiative, developments within the triad of Amman-Washington-Jerusalem gradually eroded this posture. The Jordanian suggestion that the commission help bring about a Jordanian-Israeli settlement was ignored, as Amman was maneuvered into closing ranks with Arab states less eager to conclude peace.
