ABSTRACT
The principal danger is that long-term problems associated with overlooked dimensions of the environment may be ignored. The antidote is, of course, a systematic appraisal that addresses the various aspects of environment and their relationship to other variables in terms of both their short- and longer-term implications. The same aspect of the environment that is favorable during an insurgency's formative stage may actually become a hindrance at a later point. With respect to the physical environment, events in Guatemala, Thailand, Oman, Kurdistan, and Angola support the proposition that rugged terrain in remote regions facilitates guerrilla operations and the creation of base areas. Like the environment, popular support traditionally has been viewed as a major determinant of insurgent fortunes. In Ulster and Uruguay the emphasis on urban terrorism led insurgents to create small-scale organizations. Despite the tact that in Ulster, Thailand, and Oman external support has been an important factor behind insurgent achievements, its impact has been limited.
