ABSTRACT
The international law association (IMF), unlike the Augsburg Fuggers, is not interested in making profits by lending money. Over indebtedness made it impossible for recipient states to finance measures of social policy to compensate for some of the unwelcome effects of IMF conditionality. An infringement of the debtor states' sovereignty, always assuming full compliance with the Articles of Agreement, does not occur. When drafting IMF conditionality, it might be considered to make greater use of the Bank's expertise in setting up structural policies traditionally well-tuned to the needs of the respective developing state. The IMF has no mandate to pressure adoption of democratic structures. Nor is it charged with stopping debtor state governments from circumventing existing constitutional requirements of parliamentary control. The IMF has to gain the support of the people within the debtor states, even if that means having its plans for stabilization watered down by political parties and interest groups.
