ABSTRACT
Any attempt to reform a powerful organization rich in conservative traditions, accustomed to great independence vis-à-vis the political authorities, and immune to close scrutiny of its affairs, let alone official and open reproach, would by definition be an extremely delicate and precarious undertaking. When the organization about to be reformed is the Soviet Army—and the reforms themselves include establishing certain limits on its budget, weapons, and manpower, cutting back on international commitments, and subjecting the army, or at least some aspects of its activities, to public criticism—one might expect a certain degree of bitterness to be expressed. When the reforms amount to effectively subordinating the traditionally independent army leadership to the authority of the party and state organs, thus ending the privilege of the Soviet military to decide military policy largely by itself, one can even expect open resistance and attempts by some high-ranking army commanders to form a coalition with other dissatisfied elements on the Soviet political scene.
