ABSTRACT
Arriving at an acceptable political solution was the primary objective of the post-civil war phase of US political-military intervention. On July 25, Robert McClintock cabled John Foster Dulles that information had reached him from a Lebanese editor to the effect that Kamal Junblat, Sabri Hamadeh, and Shi'i supporters of Ahmad al-As'ad were "prepared reach accommodation with US and subsequently would not object to vigorous action against insurgent areas Beirut and Tripoli where Syrians control opposition movement through terror and intimidation."In July, McClintock had cabled Secretary Dulles to the effect that in spite of Pierre Jemayyel's claims to the contrary, his views on Lebanese Christian-Muslim relations were unchanged. The planning of US troop withdrawal and internal security measures occurred at the final stages of US occupation in Beirut. The fundamental premise of US policy with respect to Lebanon's domestic situation was that the regime rested on an unstable base.
