ABSTRACT
The dangers of prediction are all the greater in the nuclear field in which many forces interact—changing energy technology and economics, domestic political realignments and concerns, international politics and law, and global financial fluctuations. In all probability, some nonnuclear-weapon states will have both safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear activities. A weapons-usable material, it also can be used as a nuclear fuel in breeders and in light water reactors. Greater preferences in the transfer of nuclear technology should be given to states that are parties, and coordinated diplomatic efforts made to urge other nations to make that commitment. Without a strong and evolving nonproliferation regime, it will be impossible to maintain public support for the development of peaceful nuclear energy. Countries like Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, South Korea, Spain, South Africa, and China are increasingly capable of supplying one or more of the following: research reactors, nuclear fuel, consulting services, heavy water and, in some instances, sensitive technology.
