ABSTRACT
The atomic decision-making structure was defective at crucial stages of the final operation and was unable to guarantee that the strategy executed was in firm line with political goals. While the combat use of the bomb was under discussion earlier in 1945, Stimson had himself raised the problem that atomic energy would present to the post-war world and conceded that an atomic arms race could lead to the destruction of civilization. The decision-making structure was such as to ensure a flow-on of the momentum of the development of the bomb into the deliberations on its use. Firm instructions on the manner in which the operations were to be executed, especially the requirement for visual bombing, were ignored. However, a reconstruction of the operational details of the bombings provides multiple sources of disquiet. Such was the role of chance and friction that the implementation of atomic policy was demonstrably hostage to fortune, miscalculation, malfunction and overall lack of effective control.
