ABSTRACT
The term "confidence-building measure (CBM)" is, as Ambassador Goodby observes in the foreword, probably somewhat of an unfortunate choice of appellations in that it implies that CBMs can somehow cause states to have confidence in or to "trust" their potential adversaries. CBMs have little direct bearing on what is ultimately the political question of building "trust" among nations. CBMs bear a very broad and fertile relationship to deterrence. CBMs can diminish the possibilities for war arising either intentionally along the lines of World War II, such as by premeditated surprise attack, or unintentionally along the lines of World War I, either in the sense of sheer accident or of deliberate choices based on miscalculation. The purpose of both CBM types, nevertheless, is to allow an independent assessment of the character of military activities—notified, suspect, or both—and thereby alleviate or confirm suspicions, and "make it more difficult for a state to prepare for war without detection."
