ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses how uncertainties have created quasi-reforms that have moved the institutions more sideways than forward. It analyzes how the inadequate reforms of the formative years explain the ongoing disputes of 1992-1993. The chapter argues that the pressures of Yugoslavia and potential "Yugoslavias," the demands of Central and Eastern Europe for genuine security guarantees, the worries about Moscow, and the necessity of cooperation between Europe and America in the face of falling defense budgets have produced a desire for renewed pragmatism among the Allies. It proposes a combined political and military capabilities strategy that may point ail the noses in the same direction again. The end of the Cold War did not coincide with the end of the Soviet Union. The Soviet/Russian question and Central and Eastern European security needs, apprehension arose over German unification. The Conference on European Security and Cooperation accommodated a united Germany as part of a broader scheme for anchoring it in Western institutions.
