ABSTRACT
A key factor in assessing the stability and therefore the feasibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world is the concern about ‘breakout’: the prospect that one or more nations openly or clandestinely develop a nuclear-weapon capability after having accepted a non-nuclear-weapon status. The technical problem of breakout will be considered in two parts: designing and producing nuclear weapons assuming weapons-usable fissionable material is in hand, and producing weapons-usable fissionable material. There are many people worldwide whose services can be purchased, and who are trained and experienced in various aspects of nuclear science and technology. The performance penalty in using reactor-grade rather than weapons-grade plutonium decreases and can be made quite small for weapons using more advanced implosion techniques that involve a very rapid rate at which the assembly goes critical, and for boosted fission weapons. Produdng plutonium in a domestic, unsafeguarded reactor proved to be an impossible job for Sweden’s bornb project.
