ABSTRACT
The Communist Party-states of Eastern Europe will require strong doses of de-Leninization if they are to overcome their acute domestic problems. Sustained economic recovery, technological innovation, industrial modernization, and prolonged social stability will necessitate major political surgery that could imperil the traditional principles of single-party rule and centralized planning. Moscow's imperial priorities in the East bloc revolve around three key prerequisites: the maintenance of overall Kremlin control; the assurance of internal stability through the preservation of Communist Party rule; and smooth leadership transitions where aging leaders are nearing the end of their tenure. One can detect the emergence of three broad interpretations among East Europe's political opposition regarding Gorbachev's impact in the bloc. These diagnoses and prescriptions can be characterized in turn as "positivist," "negativist," and "potentialist." The period of East-West détente in the 1970s formalized relationships with Eastern Europe on the assumption that the reduction of international tensions would help to liberalize Communism.
