ABSTRACT
Conventionalists generally seem to underestimate the reality of nuclear decision-making and the ever present ‘fog of war’ in the conduct of military operations. A counterforce war supposes that the two superpowers are in relatively good command and control of their nuclear forces, during and after the occurance of nuclear attacks, and that they are able to carry out strikes and counterstrikes in an orderly fashion. As the conventional argument goes, a decapitating counterforce first-strike would paralyze the enemy’s ability to retaliate, which is why this nuclear doctrine is judged feasible and desirable. If in the confusion of a limited nuclear conflict, the President, Vice-President, other key political leaders and principal military officers were dead; a lot of uncertainty would exist about who has the right to exercise leadership. The probability of countervalue retaliation is only increased by the possibility of alternate nuclear decision-making control over the release of nuclear weapons.
