ABSTRACT
The popularity of the doctrine of counterforce is to be explained by the fact that it gives the illusion of a technical solution to problems arising from the US-Soviet atomic relationship. The Ronald Reagan Administration came into office with the firm belief that the US had fallen behind the Soviet Union in the nuclear arms race. The effect of the Reagan approach to nuclear strategy, doctrine and arms control, from 1981 to 1984, damaged quite seriously the American strategic consensus on nuclear deterrence. As a step further in providing for technical guarantees that nuclear parity would not mean strategic self-deterrence in the event of a Soviet aggression, National Security Decision Memorandum-242 insisted on the necessity for American nuclear forces to exert escalation dominance. The changes in nuclear doctrine, from an assured destruction posture to a limited nuclear options posture provided, in the eyes of Schlesinger, better assurance that the problem of nuclear parity was dealt with in a credible manner.
