ABSTRACT
Post-disengagement actions play a greater role in successful, long-term disengagement than was suggested in the hypotheses. With respect to mission and role perceptions, it was hypothesized that disengagement would be fostered by setting responsibilities and expectations that clearly differentiated between "military" and "political" duties. Meaningful disengagement would thus require wholesale revision of the "praetorian" conditions that encouraged continuing high levels of military involvement in politics. The framework for analysis, it appears in retrospect, correctly stressed the importance of intra-military divisions in encouraging disengagement. Disengagement poses special problems, if it is to be coupled with reform and not be simply a pell-mell retreat to the barracks, and especially if it is carried out in the face of institutional division compounded by severe economic weaknesses. Disengagement of the armed forces from politics in the absence ofseriousefforts to create effective political institutions and lasting legitimation will likely be temporary.
