ABSTRACT
In the early 1980s the Guatemalan army was facing defeat by the revolutionary forces, which had been gaining strength since 1975. The insurgents' military operations had spread to most of the country and began to be felt in the capital and in major economic zones. Since World War II, regular armies in other countries have repeatedly applied modern counterinsurgency principles in the effort to control internal insurgencies, succeeding in some instances and failing in others. Basic concept of counterinsurgency doctrine is the necessity to control the population, which constitutes the support base for the insurgent forces. The prolongation of the war enabled the Guatemalan army to gain valuable experience and to refine its counterinsurgency strategy in both content and style. Government functions come to depend on the armed forces as a mechanism that permits both tighter control of the population in insurgent regions and pursuit of public and private development policies within the framework of counterinsurgency.
