ABSTRACT
Immanuel Kant must take an antirealist view of the truth or falsity of counterfactuals of freedom. In Kant’s own broad sketch of Kant's account—using a malicious lie as an example—the causal laws must be determined, as best they can be, from an observed regularity between the action-type and the relevant antecedent psychological conditions. Ironically, some contemporary Kantians and neo-Kantians are likely to take issue with the claim that there is a role—any role—for this empirical model of the will seemingly presupposed by the natural standpoint on the will. The two-standpoints account of the will is the basis of Kant’s quasi-solution to the problem of freedom and determinism. It must confront the well-known problem that Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena or the related distinction between things in themselves and appearances, seems to be at odds with his own famous critique of metaphysics.
