In this chapter, the author outlines several positions which, from some external perspectives, at least, count as forms of global object anti-realism. In particular, phenomenalists would be loathe to admit that what makes physical object statements unperspicuous is that there aren't really any physical objects. The phenomenalist and John Searle will admit to being ontologically unserious about tables and properties respectively. There are several metaphysical pictures which tend to suggest that the concept of an object has no place in any perspicuous characterization of reality. Some have been more or less explicitly endorsed by the specific philosophers. Others have no obvious adherents, but deserve to be taken no less seriously for that. The phenomenalist too will want to make similar claims about physical object talk in relation to facts about sense data. The author several brands of object nihilism, ranging in character from the unabashedly metaphysical to the avowedly anti-metaphysical.