ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the overridingness thesis against the sorts of objections, particularly those put forward by Susan Wolf and Bernard Williams. It deals with Slote's characterization of admirable immorality. The chapter considers three different arguments for the rejection of the overridingness thesis. These are: Wolf's argument, which connects the ideal of moral sainthood with the overridingness thesis, Williams's argument, based on his view of practical rationality, that the overridingness thesis makes an unreasonable demand on the agent and Wolf's argument those moral considerations. The overridingness thesis maintains that moral considerations always override nonmoral considerations in cases of conflict because morality has special dignity and weight. Wolf seems to anticipate that her saintly interpretation of Kantian morality can be answered. Williams's model of practical reason is Humean in holding that internal reasons alone give an agent a motive to act. Williams's strategy is to deprive Kantian morality of one of its key resources, namely, a Kantian conception of practical reason.
