ABSTRACT
One of the most revealing interpretations of Britain's approach to Africa was offered in 1971 not by a British foreign secretary but by the serving British ambassador to Pretoria. British intelligence cooperation with the South Africans, Portuguese and white Rhodesians was never disrupted. Britain's voting pattern in the Security Council was consistently protective of the South Africans, Portuguese and even the Rhodesians. The emergence of Zimbabwe as a black-ruled state, immediately neighbouring the Republic, hardly simplified the nature of the crisis extending throughout Southern Africa. In Britain, prime ministers and their cabinet colleagues can enunciate the noblest of intentions, but, by the nature of the civil service system, they must leave fulfilment of policies to officialdom. By virtue of history, relative economic strength and political influence, Britain was always looked upon by its partners as occupying a special position, with the obligation, as the first among equals, to set an example in fulfilment of shared values.
