ABSTRACT
In two important books, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and The Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty has developed an iconoclastic metaphilosophy (philosophy of philosophy, if you will) that, as we have seen, has struck at the heart of the traditional self-image of philosophy, including "scientific analytical philosophy." Kim, in his critique of Rorty, notes that "three central themes emerge as fundamental components" of the philosophical tradition Rorty rejects and sets out to transcend. Kim thinks it is important that we isolate these three components and inspect them separately. The three components are: the Platonic doctrine concerning truth and knowledge, the Cartesian doctrine of mind, and the Kantian concept of philosophy as foundational for the rest of culture. Kim claims that what is at rock bottom in Rorty's critique of Platonic realism is Rorty's claim that the notion of correspondence in the correspondence theory of truth is hopelessly metaphysical and without content.
