ABSTRACT

This chapter considers learning in Soviet behavior toward the United States in the decade surrounding Leonid Brezhnev's rise to primacy as leader in 1971. "New" thinking about the United States, international relations, and Soviet policy requirements was certainly to be observed in these years. New conservative thinking, which viewed cooperation essentially as a form of protracted conflict with the United States, was assimilated by the regime and incorporated into its outward behavior. To the degree that overt Soviet consensual knowledge was informed by concepts of capitalist stabilization, revolutionary objectives would be devalued relative to possible gains from collaborative action, and conservative preferences for internal policy would yield ground to reformism. Compared with situational assessment, overt Soviet discourse on policy matters was highly guarded. As such, it seemed closer to the operative consensus of the regime. Contrasting conservative and reformist orientations were nevertheless to be observed in published Soviet comment on ends and means in dealing with the United States.