ABSTRACT
Competition policy in transitional economies is something of a novelty, as it had few institutional, policy, or ideological precursors in the old system. De-monopolization in Russia has proceeded at a slower pace than in the Central European transitional economies, which has complicated macroeconomic stabilization efforts. The courts' significance in competition policy is further underscored by the fact that, once appealed, rulings by competition offices in some countries are held in abeyance pending the completion of judicial review. The resulting declines in political support can render competition policy partly or wholly ineffective. This places a premium on the competition offices' abilities to develop new political coalitions in support of pro-competitive economic policies. It is often argued that the emphasis on dominant firm regulation universally apparent in post-communist competition law is mistaken. Facilitating the development of comparable methodologies for defining markets and measuring structural concentration should therefore be an important goal in the provision of technical assistance in competition policy matters.
