ABSTRACT
The existence of Israel's nuclear arsenal is a "given" in the Middle Eastern strategic equation. As a result of wrong assumptions about the number, power, sophistication, delivery systems, or other aspects of Israel's atomic weaponry, the numerous analyses of its strategic options and capabilities could be seriously in error. Israel's probable atomic testing experience, bomb-building method, bomb-design preferences, access to fissionable material, and capacity to manufacture atomic armaments, as well as the likely number, power, readiness, and location of fission weapons, are all important aspects of Israel's nuclear strength. A uranium atomic weapon should have a critical mass that is over 20%, and preferably over 90%, pure U-235. Plutonium-239 is chemically different from the uranium impurities from which it must be extracted and so can be removed through several relatively simple chemical means. Nuclear self-sufficiency is another reason for the Israelis to prefer plutonium over uranium bombs.
