ABSTRACT
This chapter examines how the Johnson administration attempted to modify United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) policy. It also examines the costs of US policy to the U.A.R. and the United States. The chapter discusses the appropriateness of US objectives in the short and long run. The Arab states at the time fell into three loosely-defined camps: revolutionary—U.A.R., Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria; conservative—Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, and Morocco; and neutral—Lebanon, Tunisia, and Sudan. With increasing shortages of food and foreign exchange, the U.A.R.’s first five-year plan depended heavily on foreign aid. The U.A.R. had neither the infrastructure nor the trained managerial talent to achieve such economic growth. US-U.A.R. relations improved after the election of John F. Kennedy. The appointment of Arabist John Badeau, former president of the American University in Cairo, as Ambassador to the U.A.R. seemed to indicate a desire by President Kennedy to develop an understanding of the Arab perspective.
