ABSTRACT
Developments leading to the Arab-Israeli war on October 6, 1973, provided the first test of the new US-Soviet crisis-prevention regime. After the Arab-Israeli war ended, it would have been desirable for Soviet and US leaders to discuss lessons that could be derived from that experience for clarifying and strengthening their crisis-prevention agreements. Failure of the Soviets to prevent their Arab allies from starting the war and the support Moscow gave the Arabs during the war called into question within the United States the entire detente relationship. From an early stage in the crisis Richard M. Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to limit the political damage at home to their detente policy. They were not inclined to berate the Soviets for having failed to warn them more explicitly of the forthcoming Arab resort to arms or to initiate urgent consultation with the United States to head off the war. Soviet leaders complained repeatedly at being excluded from the Middle East negotiations.
