ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the apparent Soviet reasoning for concluding that strategic superiority has an extended political significance, and the logical case for arguing that strategic superiority has an important effect upon international political relations. It assesses the strategic balance in an attempt to determine whether the Soviet Union is gaining a politically meaningful strategic superiority. The Soviets have given some limited indication in their public literature of the theoretical basis for their claim that strategic superiority has an extended political influence. Measuring strategic forces constitutes the focus of the weapons and arms control debates in the United States. The Soviet Union may be entering a period wherein it could coerce the United States to conciliate following a preemptive counterforce attack, or survive American retaliation should coercion fail. The Assured Vulnerability model of deterrence, and the Flexible Targeting variant are dangerously inadequate as the basis of US strategic doctrine in light of Soviet intentions, doctrine, and capabilities.
