ABSTRACT
The tendency in the United States (US) has been to assess deterrence efficacy in deference to Assured Vulnerability. However, given the revolutionary orientation of Soviet foreign policy, the war-fighting/war-winning emphasis of Soviet strategic doctrine, and the deterrent responsibilities of American strategic forces, a condition of mutual vulnerability is far from a suitable standard for US deterrence desiderata. Presidential Directive 59 identifies the offensive side of the most effective deterrent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, i.e., threatening the political control and military power of the Soviet leadership. Such a threat is intended to deny the Soviets any anticipation of victory in their own terms. A Classical Strategy approach to deterrence should provide a deterrent posture that is compatible with American responsibilities. The arguments against Classical Strategy are a reflection of the differing assumptions of Assured Vulnerability and Flexible Targeting. Developments in the early 1980s indicate a slow trend toward greater US acceptance of Classical Strategy.
